
By Masaharu Hanazaki, Joseph Fan, Juro Teranishi
This ebook deliberates on a few pressing matters that face the hot structure of the monetary platforms in Japan and East Asia. The booklet is damaged into 3 sections:*The function of economic associations and markets in monetary improvement in Japan and East Asia*Issues in company governance and new technologies*The designing of effective monetary systemsWith contributions from major Asian economics specialists dependent all over the world, this e-book should be valuable to either students and pros with an curiosity in monetary platforms, company financing and governance.
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Extra info for Designing Financial Systems for East Asia and Japan (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Growth Economies of Asia)
Example text
Banks in the corporate governance structure It is widely argued that banks were important in postwar Japan, not only because they constituted an efficient conduit between ultimate savers and investors, but also because they were essential to corporate governance. 2 This view holds that banks monitored and disciplined the management of borrower firms via intimate, long-term relationships with the firms. These long-term connections, often called “main bank relationships,” were based not only on standard loan contracts but also on cross-shareholding between banks and their client firms.
4). For instance, 474 firms are defined as having stable main bank relationships and 283 firms as having unstable main bank relationships during the first period (1971–1980). Other firms – a surprising number, in fact – are ambiguous with respect to their main bank relationships. 4 compares the averages of relevant variables of the firms with stable main bank relationships with those of the firms with unstable main bank relationships during two time periods: 1971–1980 and 1981–1990. 4 Comparison of firms with stable main bank relationships and those with unstable main bank relationships (%; standard deviations in parentheses) 1971–1980 1981–1990 Firms with stable main banks (A) Firms with unstable main banks (B) No.
However, the contestable market hypothesis shows that a higher market concentration of sales does not necessarily mean a higher degree of monopoly (Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1982). Thus, it is ambiguous whether SALEi is a reliable measure of monopoly in a specific industry. An alternative to SALEi is the degree of a firm’s exposure to global competition. When the Japanese government started liberalizing manufacturing trade in the early 1960s, the nation’s manufacturing firms were faced with fierce competition from abroad.